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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent desires to state additional facts sup-
plementing the statement of facts of the appellant. 
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF RIGHT OF wAY: 
The right of way acquired by the respondents by the 
warranty deed marked exhibit "B", was 11 feet North ahd 
South and 160 East and West. The Surveyor, Maxwell, 
testified that the physical location of the said right of 
way, was over the North 11 feet of the Wood property 
and comes right up to the \Vilkinson line (Tr. 6). The 
defendant, Carlos Wood, testified that the right of way 
was measured and intended to be over to the property line 
of Wilkinson (Tr. 76-77). 
LocATION OF BuiLDINGS WITH RESPECT TO HIGHWAY: 
The building of Mr. Wood is situated 25.8 feet West 
of the highway property line. The front of the Wilkinson 
building is jogged so that the North front portion is set 
back from the highway line 25.8 feet and the South por-
tion is set back an additional 55 feet as shown by plain-
tiff's exhibit "A", the survey plat. 
Carlos Wood testified that so far as he was con-
cerned, the area between the buildings and the highway 
and East from the block wall to the highway was always 
intended to be open and unobstructed and there was no 
attempt to designate any entrance to the right of \vay at 
any point between the highway line and the front of the 
building (Tr. 88-89). 
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Finley Wilkinson testified that at the time the con-
struction was commenced on the wall by the defendant, 
he was out of town and immediately upon his return he 
noticed that the wall was being constructed and the first 
row of blocks was being laid; that he had a conversation 
with the defendant at that time and told the defendant to 
stop construction; that the defendant continued the con-
struction thereafter (Tr. 33-34). That exhibit "D" and 
"E" were notices served upon the contractor and Mr. 
Wood to discontinue construction of the wall (Tr. 51-52). 
The defendant, Carlos Wood testified that he had a con~ 
versation with Harold Wilkinson at the time the footings 
were placed, which conversation was as follows (Tr. 83-
84): 
"Q. Now, you said that at the time you con-
structed-that you began the construction on 
the block wall you had a conversation with 
Harold Wilkinson~ 
... \.. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time the footings 'Yere just in? 
A. We had just put the footings in. 
Q. Didn't he tell you to stop construction on it-? 
A. No, not exactly. In fact 'Ye got together on the 
height of the "Tall, and about "There it 'vould 
go. 
Q. Well, you said not exactlY, did he tell You to 
go ahead and build the 'v~ll '? • 
A. No. He didn't use those \Vords. He didn ,t tell 
rne to stop building the 'Yall. 
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Q. Did he say he approved of the wall~ 
A. No, I don't think he did. At first we had quite 
a conversation. Harold and I talked together 
for two or three nights and at one time we did 
get together on about how high I should put 
the wall and step it down. I vvas going out to 
'vhere the pipe was in the first place, and he 
talked me into staying back aways. 
Q. At any time did he consent that you build 
the 'vall~ 
A. That I don't knovv. In his words, he didn't tell 
me that." 
UsE OF RIGHT OF WAY BEFORE OBSTRUCTION: 
Finley Wilkinson testified that by warranty deed 
dated November 30, 1953, 'vhich was plaintiffs' exhibit 
"B", plaintiffs acquired the right of way in question to-
gether with a tract in rear of his building 52 feet by 256.66 
feet ( Tr. 23). That there was no obstruction which \\Tould 
prevent entry upon the right of way at any point from 
the Wilkinson property beginning at the highway and 
extending Westerly about 80 feet to the Wilkinson build-
ing ( Tr. 26) ; that about a year after the right of way 
was acquired, the defendant erected three steel posts 
about five feet apart along the North line of the right 
of way and about in line with the front of the building 
(Tr. 27) ; that even after the erection of the steel posts the 
plaintiffs continued to go between the posts and the Wil-
kinson building to enter the right of 'vay (Tr. 27); that 
to restrict the plaintiff from crossing on to the right of 
way where they had so crossed before the construction of 
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the block wall vvas inconvenient, and an unreasonable re-
striction upon the use by the plaintiff, in that the wrecker 
has difficulty entering the restricted area; every vehicle 
of the plaintiffs which must be moved to the back lot must 
travel to the specific entrance between the Wood building 
and the block wall; the customers of the plaintiff have 
had difficulty in using the right of way and at least two 
customers have hit the block vvall, causing damage to their 
automobile; that the automobiles of customers must be 
driven to the rear parking area by the plaintiffs or em-
ployees of the plaintiffs because the custo1ners object to 
use of the narrow alley, ( Tr. 28) ; that the situation now 
\Vith the block wall erected it is possible for one vehicle 
to park at the restricted entrance and effectively block 
the whole right of way, whereas before the plaintiff could 
enter and leave the right of \Yay from the plaintiffs' prop-
erty along where the block vvall is no\Y constructed (Tr. 
:29); it costs the plaintiffs extra m.oney and time in hav-
ing to traverse the lot to enter at the restricted entrance 
(Tr. 31), and that it is more of a hazard because of con-
gestion on the highway and the approaches from the 
highway to require vehicles to enter only from the re-
stricted entrance \Yhereas before it \Yas not necessary to 
even travel East of the building line in order to enter the 
right of way (Tr. 31). That ~Ir. \\' ood rarely used this 
particular right of \Yay since ~fr. \\ ... ood has approaches 
on the South side of his building \Yhirh are pri1narily used 
as his entrance (Tr. 30). That son1e tilne in Noven1ber, 
1954, defendant erected the three steel posts and that 
Finley Wilkinson called his attorney, Harold \\'ilkinson 
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and was advised that since Mr. Wood was a neighbor and 
would be in business there ·a long time, it \vould be better 
not to stir up any trouble unless something worse hap-
pened, and to just let it go ( Tr. 49). 
Carlos Wood testified that he erected the three steel 
posts about four or five feet apart so that the three posts 
occupied a space of about 10 feet along the North line of 
the right of way (Tr. 74-75); that Mr. Wilkinson uses the 
subject right of way more than the defendant does, and 
\vould be just as interested in keeping the right of way 
open as would the defendant (Tr. 78); that Wood has 
about 70 or 80 feet on the South side of the building \vhich 
can be used as an approach to the rear of the Wood prop-
erty, and is so used (Tr. 77, (Tr. 64). 
REASONS DEFENDANT CoxsTRUCTED THE WALL : 
Defendant Wood testified that his reasons for build-
ing the \vall were about as follows: 
a. To make a definite right of way down through 
the two businesses to separate the businesses (Tr. 64). 
b. To remedy a parking problem, although, defend-
ant had not placed signs or other\vise marked, or painted 
a designated right of \vay and, presently, \vith the \vall 
constructed, one car parked at the restricted entrance ef-
fectively blocks the whole right of way ( Tr. 79). 
c. To prevent ruts in the right of way, although 
there are no ruts now after black topping (Tr. 81). 
d. To prevent spilling of oil on the drive vvay, al-
though l\fr. Wood never mentioned to ~Ir. Wilkinson 
about the oil being poured on the drive way (Tr. 83). 
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e. To make it possible to level the drive way, al-
though the drive way could be leveled and black topped 
without the erection of the wall (Tr. 86). 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PROPERTY : 
The defendant Carlos Wood testified that the nego-
tiations concerning the purchase of the right of way and 
the sale of rear property, transpired in October of 1953 
(Tr. 58); that the negotiations commenced after a re-
survey raised some question as to the location of the 
West end of the vVilkinson building (Tr. 58) ; that Charles 
0. Dunn was the owner of the Wood property \Yhich :\Ir. 
Wood was buying under contract, and that :Jir. Dunn who 
is an attorney and a real estate man joined in the nego-
tiations (Tr. 72-74). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
IN CONSTRUING EASEMENTS THE INTENTION OF 
THE PARTIES IS PARAMOUNT. SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORY NO. 1, WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY 
TO DETERMINE THE MATTER OF INTENTION. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT FOR NOl\IINAL D.A:\I.AGES W.AS 
PROPER. 
POINT III. 
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE CHANGED AS TO LOCA-
TION WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT OF SERVIENT AND 
DOMINANT OWNER. 
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POINT IV. 
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE OBSTRUCTED BY 
FENCES OR OTHER MEANS WITHOUT PROOF OF NECES-
SITY FOR PRESERVATION OF SERVIENT ESTATE AND 
'VITHOUT UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE WITH 
DOMINANT ESTATE. 
POINT V. 
THE ACT OF ONE TENANT IN COMMON DOES NOT 
BIND HIS COTENANTS IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC 
AUTHORITY. 
ARGli~IENT 
POINT I. 
IN CONSTRUING EASEMENTS, THE INTENTION OF 
THE PARTIES IS PARAMOUNT. SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORY NO. 1, WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY 
TO DETERMINE THE MATTER OF INTENTION. 
The rule of construction of instruments creating 
easements in land is set forth in the opinion of this court 
in the case of Stevens, et al. v. Bird-J ex Company, 81 U. 
355, 18 P. 2d 292, as follows: 
Hin construing instruments creating ease-
ments in land, the court will look to the circum-
stances attending the transaction, the situation 
of the parties, the state of the thing granted, and 
the object to be attained, to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the parties.'' 
In the instant case the plaintiffs purchased from the 
defendant a tract of land 52 feet wide by 256.66 feet, as 
shown on exhibit "C" in yellow ( Tr. 57). These negotia-
tions beginning in October 1953, for the purchase of this 
tract, followed a discrepancy in surveys under -w-hir It the 
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Wilkinson building would have encroached on the tract 
shown in yellow (Tr. 58). The land in rear was acquired 
by the plaintiff for the purpose of parking automobiles 
left with the plaintiffs for the purpose of repair or stor-
age, and the right of way was for the use in taking auto-
mobiles to and from the shop building, which has only an 
East entrance, to the parking area in rear (Tr. 25). There 
was no obstruction which would prevent access to the 
right of way any where along where the present block 
wall is constructed at the time the parking area \Yas ac-
quired by the plaintiffs (Tr. 26), until about a year after 
acquisition of the property by the plaintiffs. The defend-
ant installed three steel posts as shown on exhibit "C", 
which would occupy about 10 feet along the right of "~ay. 
The defendant testified that prior to the purchase of the 
rear property by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs \Yere using 
the right of way for parking of vehicles in rear (Tr. 63)., 
and while the defendant stated that the three steel posts 
were in place at the time of the purchase~ he further 
testified that the plaintiffs immediately began use of the 
right of way because they needed it, and that they would 
come from the side, using the drive "~ay "side\\~ays. ·~ ( Tr. 
63). The defendant further confirn1ed ''That Finley \\ ... il-
kinson had previously stated, that the rear area "\Yas used 
to park cars of customers and en1ployees. and that the 
use of the right of way by \-Vilkinsons "\Yas n1ore extensive 
than the use by the defendant (Tr. 6±). 
The Warranty Deed conYe~~ing the rear property and 
the right of \\Tay states, "together \Yith a right of \Yay oYer 
and through the follo,ving described property:·· and then 
10 
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follows the description of the right of way, by metes and 
bounds. There is nothing in the instrument which would 
indicate that the right of way was restricted only to in-
gress and egress or that it was restricted as to entrance 
from any point along the plaintiff's boundary. As set 
forth in the respondent's statement of facts, the defend-
ant, himself, testified that the entire right of way was in-
tended to be open extending from the East line of the 
buildings to the highway, which specifically negatives any 
inference that the entrance was to be restricted to 11 feet 
immediately at the highway. In fact, all of the testimony 
indicated that it would be practically impossible and not 
\vithin the intention of either of the parties that the en-
trance be restricted to 11 feet at the highway. Under 
these circumstances, the question then of the intention 
of the parties as to whether or not there was to be any 
restriction upon plaintiffs' entrance on to the right of \vay 
becomes important. The interrogatory submitted to the 
jury clearly resolves the question of intention of the 
parties as to the matter of intention that the access from 
the plaintiffs' side would be unrestricted. Even after 
the erection of the three steel posts which the plaintiffs 
did not protest in the interest of maintaining good rela-
tions with their neighbor, the plaintiffs still had about 
-±0 feet of open passageway West of the steel posts. 
The case of Alrnada, et al. v. Superior Conrt in aud 
for Napa County, a California case, 149 P.2d 61, defines 
the phrase "right of way" as follows : 
11 
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"\V. ebster's New International Dictionary de-
fines a right of way as 'a right of passage over an-
other person's land.' And this definition has been 
so universally incorporated into innumerable deci-
sions that it may be said to be generally accepted. 
Sometiines it is a right of \vay for a road, some-
times for a ditch, son1etimes for a canal, but what-
ever the particular right of way may be for, it is a 
right of passage over another person's land, or, 
in other words, an easement to use the land of 
another for such particular purpose. See 54 C.J. 
824. As was said in the case of San Pedro, etc., R. 
Co. v. Pillsbury, 23 ·Cal. App. 675, at page 680, 139 
P. 669, 671: 'The term "right of way" denotes the 
tenure by which land is held; it is descriptive of 
the easement right and not of the land to which it 
is affixed.' " 
In the early case of K ripp v. Cttrtis, 71 Cal. 62, at 
page 63, 11 P. 879, the court said: 
"The privilege \Yhich one person, or particular 
description of persons, may have of passing over 
the land of another in some particular line is term-
ed a right of way." 
The following statement is taken fron1 a decision of 
this court in the case of Clawson v. TT.,. allace. 16 l~. 300, at 
page 306: 
"The right of travel over another's land 1nay 
be deno1ninated an 'easen1ent' or 'right of \Yay.' '' 
The appellant seeks to place a restriction on the use 
of the drivevvay 1nerely for purposes ingress and egress, 
and ,vjth a restricted entranee of 11 feet at the high\Yay, 
all of which is contrary to the language of the instrun1ent 
12 
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creating the right of way and to the intention of the par-
ties at the time of the creation of the easement. 
It would be more consistent and in accordance with 
the intention of the parties if the two eleven foot ends 
'vere blocked or fenced rather than to block or fence the 
North and South boundaries of the right of way, in that 
it would be a rare exception for any vehicle to enter at the 
eleven foot end near the highway, since this approach is 
impractical and was never contemplated by either of the 
parties. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES WAS 
PROPER. 
The jury saw fit to R\vard no damages to the plain-
tiffs, and a reasonable inference is that they failed to 
award substantial damages for the reason that the de-
fendant would be confronted with the expense for the wall 
which would have to be removed, and the jury may have 
concluded that the interests of the plaintiffs would have 
been satisfied by the removal of the wall. 
At any rate the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal 
damages to protect their substantial right to the use of an 
unobstructed easement. In the case of Gotttld v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah ~d 187, 
this court held, "N on1inal da1nages is a trivial su1n such 
as one cent or one dollar R\varded to a plain tiff \vhose 
legal right has been invaded but who has failed to prove 
any compensatory damages." 
Also in the case of N asner v. Buton, 2 lJ tah 2d 236, 
this court held as follows: 
13 
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"An unexcused failure to perform a contract 
is a legal wrong. Action will lie for the breach al-
though it causes no injury. Nominal damages are 
then awarded ... Even though a breach of con-
tract benefits a plaintiff, he can, nevertheless~ 
recover nominal damages." 
The plaintiff had a substantial right which required 
protection anq the award of nominal damages by the 
court was entirely proper. 
POINT III. 
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE CHANGED AS TO LO·CA-
TION WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT OF SERVIENT AND 
DOMINANT OWNERS. 
The evidence 'vas undisputed that the right of 'Yay 
granted by the defendant to the plaintiffs "\Yas to adjoin 
and abut the property of the plaintiffs for a \\idth of 
11 feet. The defendant in construction of an 8 inch block 
wall, having a 9 inch cap and located "\Yithin the described 
right of way, has either obstructed the right of way or 
changed the location of the right of 'Yay "ithout the con-
sent of the plaintiffs or both. The defendant in arguing 
that he could still 1nake available a \\Tidth of 11 feet be-
t\\Teen the \\Tall and the building~ if true~ 'Yould runount to 
a change of location of the right of 'Yay "Tithout the eon-
sent of the plaintiffs. 
The case of Sta1natis Y. J oh11sou, :2:2-± P.:2d :201~ .... \ri-
zona 1950, states the follo"\Ying \\ith respect to change of 
location of an easen1ent: 
14 
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~· "The general and almost universal rule with 
reference to change in the location of an easement 
after the location has once been definitely estab-
lished, regardless of whether it has been acquired 
by grant or prescription, is laid down as follows 
in 17 Am. Jur., Easements, Section 87: 'The gen-
eral rule is that the location of an easement once 
selected cannot be changed by either the land-
owner or the easement owner without the other's 
consent. The reason for this rule is that treating 
the location as variable would incite litigation and 
depreciate the value and diseourage the improve-
Inent of the land upon which the easement is 
charged. Accordingly, a definite location of an 
easement determines and limits the right of the 
gran tee so that he cannot again exercise a choice. 
Similarly, a definite location binds the grantor so 
that he has no right either to hinder the grantee in 
the exercise of his right to compel him to accept 
another location, although the latter location may 
be equally convenient with the right or privilege 
originally granted. Furthermore, many courts hold 
that a right of way by prescription, which runs 
in a definite course to a fixed point, is no more 
subject to change by parol agreement or by acts or 
conduct than if it had been created and so de-
scribed by deed. The location, however, may be 
changed with the express or implied consent of 
both parties, and an estoppel to claim a .former lo-
cation to be the true one arises from acquiescence 
in a change.' The rules are stated as follows in 28 
C.J.S., Easements, §84. 'As a general rule, in 
the absence of statutes to the contrary, the location 
of an easement cannot be changed by either party 
without the other's consent, after it has been once 
established either by the express terms of the 
grant or by the acts of the parties, except under 
15 
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the authority of an express or implied grant or 
reservation to this effect. It is competent, ho,vever, 
for the parties to change the location by mutual 
consent, and such consent may be implied from 
their acts and acquiescence. After a change has 
been made by mutual consent, the general rule 
again operates to prevent a further change of lo-
cation by either party without the other's con-
sent.' " 
In the case of Yottngstown Steel Products Co. of Cal. 
v. City of Los Angeles7 et al.7 California 1952, 2-±0 P.2d 
977, where the city had maintained a po,Yer line at a 
height of 51¥2 feet, and the plaintiff sought to compel 
them to raise the height to at least 61 feet, the court in 
holding that the easement could not be changed \\ithout 
the consent of the parties stated as follo\YS: 
"vVhere the right of \Yay has been used at a 
particular location \Yi th the acquieseence of the 
servient o\vner, the parties have, in effect placed 
their O\vn practical construction upon the grant, 
and the easement "~ill be regarded as fixed at that 
place. 
''Once the location of an easement has been 
finally established, \Yhether by express ter1ns of 
the grant or by use and acquiescence~ it eannot be 
substantially changed \Yithout the consent of both 
parties. 
''And the grantor has no right either to hinder 
the grantee in his use of the \Yay or to ron1pel hnn 
to aeeept another loeation, even though a ne\v loca-
tion nla)~ be just as eonYenient." 
The defendant atten1pted to change the loeation of 
said rig·ht of \YaY in such a 1nanner "~hirh \vould seriouslY 
< • • 
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inconvenience the plaintiffs, and which would seem to be 
clearly contrary to the rules of law set forth above. 
POINT IV. 
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE OBSTRUCTED BY 
FENCES OR OTHER MEANS WITHOUT PROOF OF NECES-
SITY FOR PRESERVATION OF SERVIENT ESTATE AND 
WITHOUT UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE WITH 
DOMINANT ESTATE. 
An analysis of the reasons advanced by the defend-
ant, Wood, for building the block wall would indicate that 
the same was constructed more for the purpose of incon-
veniencing the plaintiff than for the convenience of the 
defendant. 
One reason advanced by the defendant for the con-
struction of the wall was that it made a definite right of 
\Vay down through the two businesses to separate the 
businesses ( Tr. 64). An examination of the photos and 
other exhibits indicates that prior to the erection of the 
\vall, the businesses were sufficiently separated and indi-
vidually identified. If the evidence had shown that the 
plaintiffs were encroaching South onto the other property 
of the defendant, it may have indicated a justification 
on the part of the defendant to erect a wall on the South 
side Df the right of way, but the erection of the wall on the 
North side of the right of way does nothing to protect 
the property of the defendant. None of the remaining 
property of the defendant was fenced. 
The defendant said that the wall was constructed also 
because of the parking problem (Tr. 79) in that vehicles 
were parked on the right of way by customers of the 
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plaintiffs and defendant. It was readily admitted by the 
defendant that the plaintiffs used the right of way more 
than the defendant did, and that this right of way was 
the only one available to the plaintiffs, so that the plain-
tiffs would be more interested in keeping the right of \vay 
open than would the defendant. By constructing a \vall 
the defendant so restricted the right of way that one 
vehicle parked near the restricted 11 foot entrance, could 
effectively block the entire right of \Yay, "Thereas prior 
thereto, it was possible to pass on and off of the right 
of way anywhere along where the block \vall is presently 
constructed. The construction of the block wall added to 
the congestion of the right of way, and increased the 
haza.rd by reducing visibility and maneuverability. 
The defendant said the construction of the \Vall pre-
vented ruts in the right of "~ay, (Tr. 81) although this 
was corrected by black topping. It \Yould further seen1 
that a restricted entrance would give rise to more ruts 
than would an unrestricted entrance, \vhich \Yould divide 
the traffic. 
The defendant said the erection of the \vall \vas to 
prevent spilling of oil on the drive \Yay (Tr. 83), although 
he had never mentioned to the plaintiffs about the oil 
being poured on the drive\Yay. The fact that the plain-
tiffs had a greater use of the right of \\~ay in taking their 
cars and customers cars to the rear parking area, the 
plaintiffs \vould be just as interested in keeping the right 
of \vay free from any 1naterial \vhieh could blen1ish the 
automobiles or carry debris on to the shop floor, as \vould 
the defendant. 
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The defendant said that the wall would make possible 
leveling of the right of way (Tr. 86), although he ad-
mitted that even with out the erection of the wall there 
could be substantial leveling of the right of way which 
\\"Ould permit the use of the right of way by the plaintiffs 
as prior to the erection of the wall. 
We fair to see any reason advanced by the defendant 
"vhich would show the necessity for construction of the 
,)lock wall for the purpose of preserving his own prop-
erty. 
The case of Bolton et al. v. Murphy, et al., 41 Utah 
591, 127 Pac. 335, at page 603, comments on this propo-
~i tion as follows : 
~'Appellants also insist that the court erred 
in per1nitting respondents to maintain a bar or 
gate at or near the point where the road in ques-
tion departs from the highway and enters onto 
their land, and at other points along the road east 
thereof. The evidence is again conclusive that, if 
appellants have any right to pass onto respond-
ents' land from the highway, they have such right 
without any interference whatever. Nor can we 
see why respondents desire to p)ace a bar or gate 
at that point, or at any point along the road as it 
passes over their land, since they have no fence 
along the west end thereof along the highway at 
all. But, even if they had put up such a fence, they 
cannot, at this late date, be permitted, without the 
consent of appellants, to put up bars or gates, 
at least not without showing that such obstructions 
are necessary for the preservation and proper and 
efficient use of their lands, which is the servient 
estate." 
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By erecting the block wall the defendant actually cre-
ated a burden and a hazard upon himself and his prop-
erty in that by channelizing the right of way he has ob-
structed visibility and has created a situation where the 
right of way is more readily blocked, and can be effective-
ly blocked by only one vehicle. 
The situation here is such that the same number of 
vehicles will use the right of way \vhether the entrance 
is restricted or unrestricted, but a restricted entrance 
makes for congested traffic and inconvenience to both 
parties. 
The plaintiff was granted a specific right of "~ay 
in a definite location, described by metes and bounds, 
and situated immediately adjoining plaintiff's property. 
It would seem that anything which prevented the plain-
tiffs from traversing the entire surface of the described 
right of way is an obstruction which \vas not contemplated 
by the grant. The block wall deprives the plaintiffs of the 
use of the most important nine inches of the entire \vidth 
of the right of way. 
Appellant cites Dyba v. Boro'lcit.z) as n1eeting the crux 
of the issue head_ on. An analysis of the facts in that 
case shows circumstances quite different fron1 the in-
stant case. First, in the Dyba rase the "Tording of the 
grant was limited as follows: 
"Together \vith the right of ingress. egress 
and regress ... through and oYer an alley t\vo and 
ninety-six one hundredths (:2.96/100) feet \Vide 
extending back in a \Yesterly direction to the rear 
of the building ereeted upon the adjoining prop-
Prty on the North along the line of this property.·' 
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Secondly, in the Dyba case, the first 32 feet of the alley 
was bounded by a 9 inch party wall on the South side 
and by a house on the North side, thus the right of way 
was never designated or required to abut the dominant 
property. The right of way in the Dyba case was 2.96 
feet wide and provided ingress, egress -and regress, to the 
dominant estate and apparently continued to be 2.96 feet 
wide even after erection of the fence since the fence ex-
tended along the party wall. However, in the instant case 
the right of way was designated and intended to abut 
the dominant property and was never intended to be re-
stricted to "ingress, egress and regress" through an 11 
foot alley, but was a right of way over and through the 
tract 11 feet wide by 160 feet long. 
The court in the Dyba case states the rule of con-
struction that "To ascertain the intention we must look 
to the circumstances attending the grant." 
In the case of Houghtalling v. Stoothoff, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 
510 cited by the appellant, the court in a brief one para-
graph opinion also included this important sentence that 
"The court found that the fence does not encroach upon 
the right of way:." This language of the opinion infers 
that had the fence encroached upon the right of way it 
would have been required to be removed. 
The evidence showed that plaintiffs frequently have 
to tow wrecked cars into the rear area by use of a wreck-
er, all of which requires space and an unobstructed ap-
proach. By narrowing the right of way nine inches and 
by restricting the approach this use of wrecker is greatly 
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affected, and is a much more serious situation than mere-
ly .driving car into and out of a driveway (Tr. 28). 
POINT V. 
THE ACT OF ONE TENANT IN COMMON DOES NOT 
BIND HIS COTENANTS IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC 
AUTH-ORITY. 
The appellant in his brief on page 20, infers that one 
of the respondents, Harold Wilkinson, at one time agreed 
how high the wall should be placed, and refers to the 
transcript, page 84. vV e have set forth in the statement 
of facts, verbatim the co-nversation between Harold \\,..il-
kinson and Carlos Wood as testified by Carlos \\: ood, and 
we submit that nothing in the transcript indicates any 
agreement by Harold Wilkinson to the construction of 
the wall. In fact the testimony of Carlos \v·· ood negatived 
any consent by IIarold Wilkinson to the construction of 
the wall. 
I-Iowever, even if it were assun1ed that Harold \V .. il-
kinson granted his consent in any particular, he "\Yas only 
one of three co tenants as is shown by the \\,.. arranty Deed, 
exhibit "B", and his independent act could not affect a 
\Yaiver or release of any interest of his co tenants. \\ ... e 
eite 14 American Jurisprudence, Sections 63, S±~ and 89~ 
\vhich state in substance that since no relationship of 
agency exists between tenants in con1n1on, no one of then1 
can ordinarily dispose of the interest of another in such 
a ntanner as to be binding unless duly authorized to do so. 
Furthern1ore, the defendant "\Yell kne"\Y that Finley 
Wilkinson, not Harold. Wilkinson, "\Yas the person n1ost 
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concerned since Finley was the owner-manager of the 
auto business whose livelihood depended upon the auto 
business. It is significant that the erection of the wall was 
commenced while Finley vVilkinson was out of the state. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court in the 
exercise of its powers in equity should properly have re-
quired the removal of the entire block wall, which was 
erected by the defendant upon the described right of way . 
. A11 of the circumstances attending the grant of right of 
\vay indicate that it was never intended that the right of 
way be blocked along the boundary of the plaintiff, ~and 
the answer of the jury to interrogatory number one eon-
firms this fact. 
The judgment of the trial court should be modified 
to require the removal of the entire wall. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
Bountiful, Utah 
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